Before you can use the SCEP subsystem, you need to enable the SCEP Server in the general configuration. This section explains the options for the scep enrollment workflow.
The workflow validates incoming requests against five stages. Parameters are described in detail in the section on policy settings.
- technical parameters:
- Check if key algorithm, key size and hash algorithm match the policy. If any of those checks fails, the request is rejected.
- A request can either be self-signed and provide a challenge password or use an HMAC for authentication or is signed by a trusted certificate (renewal or “signer on behalf”). You can also disable authentication or dispatch unauthorized requests to an operator for review.
- subject duplicate check:
- The database is checked for valid certificates with the same subject. If issuing the certificate would exceed the configured maximum count, the request is dispatched to an operator wo can either reject the request or take actions to meet the policy.
- The basic idea is to check requests based on the subject or additonal parameters against an external source to see if enrollment is possible. The check counts against the approval point counter, the workflow does not take any special action if the check fails.
- approval point:
- The first four stages are usually run in one step when the request hits the server. Before the certificate is issued, the request must have a sufficient number of approval points. Each operator approval is worth one point. A passed eligibility check is also worth one.
The workflow fetches all information from the configuration system at
scep.<servername> where the servername is taken from the scep wrapper configuration.
Here is a complete sample configuration:
# By default, all scep endpoints wll use the default token defined # by the scep token group, if you pass a name here, it is considered # a group name from the alias table #token: ca-one-special-scep # A renewal request is only accpeted if the used certificate will # expire within this period of time. renewal: # allow renewal 14 days before the certificate expires notbefore: 000014 # allow renewal with already expired certificate (usually not set) # replaces "allow_expired_signer", not implemented yet! notafter: 0 # If the request was a replacement, optionally revoke the replaced # certificate after a grace period revoke_on_replace: reason_code: keyCompromise delay_revocation_time: +000014 workflow: type: certificate_enroll param: # key: name in workflow context, value: parameter from scep wrapper # server and interface are always set, the mapping below is # the default set that is used when no map is given transaction_id: transaction_id signer_cert: signer_cert pkcs10: pkcs10 _url_params: url_params #_pkcs7: pkcs7 # allow rsa keys with 1020 to 2048 bit # the 1020 is necessary as some implementations can have # leading 0 in the modulus which will reduce the bitcount key_size: rsaEncryption: 1020-2048 # allowed digest algorithms used for the CSR hash_type: - sha1 - sha256 authorized_signer: rule1: # Full DN subject: CN=.+:scepclient,.* rule2: # Full DN subject: CN=.+:pkiclient,.* policy: # Authentication Options # Initial requests need ONE authentication. # Activate Challenge Password and/or HMAC by setting the appropriate # options below. # if set requests can be authenticated by an operator allow_man_authen: 1 # if set, no authentication is required at all and hmac/challenge is # not evaluated even if it is set/present in the request! allow_anon_enroll: 0 # Approval # If not autoapproved, allow opeerator to add approval by hand allow_man_approv: 1 # if the eligibiliyt check failed the first time # show a button to run a recheck (Workflow goes to PENDING) allow_eligibility_recheck: 0 # Approval points requirede (eligibity and operator count as one point each) # if you set this to "0", all authenticated requests are auto-approved! approval_points: 1 # The number of active certs with the same subject that are allowed # to exist at the same time, deducted by one if a renewal is seen max_active_certs: 1 # option will be removed # allow_expired_signer: 0 # If an initial enrollment is seen # all existing certificates with the same subject are revoked auto_revoke_existing_certs: 1 # allows a "renewal" outside the renewal window, the notafter date # is aligned to the old certificate. Set revoke_on_replace option # to revoke the replaced certificate. # This substitutes the "replace_window" from the OpenXPKI v1 config allow_replace: 1 response: # The scep standard is a bit unclear if the root should be in the chain # or not. We consider it a security risk (trust should be always set # by hand) but as most clients seem to expect it, we include the root # by default. # The getca response contains the certificate of the SCEP server itself # and of the current active issuer (which can but need not to be the same!) # You can define weather to have only the certificate itself (endentity), # the chain without the root (chain) or the chain including the root # (fullchain). getca: ra: fullchain issuer: fullchain profile: cert_profile: I18N_OPENXPKI_PROFILE_TLS_SERVER cert_subject_style: enroll # Mapping of names to OpenXPKI profiles to be used with the # Microsoft Certificate Template Name Ext. (18.104.22.168.4.1.311.20.2) profile_map: pc-client: I18N_OPENXPKI_PROFILE_USER_AUTHENTICATION # HMAC based authentication hmac: verysecret challenge: value: SecretChallenge eligible: initial: value@: connector:scep.scep-server-1.connector.initial args: '[% context.cert_subject_parts.CN.0 %]' expect: - Build - New renewal: value: 1 connector: initial: class: Connector::Proxy::YAML LOCATION: /home/pkiadm/ca-one/enroll.yaml
The renewal period values are interpreted as OpenXPKI::DateTime relative date but given without sign.
Upgrade from OpenXPKI v1 enrollment workflow¶
If you are upgrading from OpenXPKI 1.x enrollment workflow to the new one, you must adjust several parameters in the scep server configuration.
The syntax for the renewal period has changed, the replace_period was substituted by a boolean flag as a window did not make much sense:
# old syntax renewal_period: 000014 replace_period: 05 # new syntax renewal: notbefore: 000014 # note that the policy node already exists! policy: allow_replace: 1
signer on behalf
The name of the key has changed from authorized_signer_on_behalf to authorized_signer only:
# old syntax authorized_signer_on_behalf: rule1: ...... # new syntax authorized_signer: rule1: ......
In OpenXPKI 1.0 the default profile was set in the CGI wrapper configuration. This has been moved to a seperate node in the endpoint configuration:
profile: cert_profile: I18N_OPENXPKI_PROFILE_TLS_SERVER cert_subject_style: enroll
Configure the list of allowed key and hash algorithms.
A hash item list for allowed key sizes and algorithms. The name of the option must be the key algorithm as given by openssl, the required byte count is given as a range in bytes. There must not be any space between the dash and the numbers. Hint: Some implementations do not set the highest bit to 1 which will result in a nominal key size which is one bit smaller than the requested one. So stating a small offset here will reduce the propability to reject such a key.
List (or single scalar) of accepted hash algorithms used to sign the request.
Signer on Behalf¶
The section authorized_signer is used to define the certificates which are accepted to do a “request on behalf”. The list is given as a hash of hashes, were each entry is a combination of one or more matching rules.
Possible rules are subject, profile and identifier which can be used in any combination. The subject is evaluated as a regexp against the signer subject, therefore any characters with a special meaning in perl regexp need to be escaped! Identifier and profile are matched as is. The rules in one entry are ANDed together. If you want to provide alternatives, add multiple list items. The name of the rule is just used for logging purpose.
The request must carry the password in the challengePassword attribute. The sample config above shows a static password example but it is also possible to use request parameters to lookup a password using connectors:
challenge: mode: bind value@: connector:scep.connectors.challenge args: - "[% context.cert_subject %]" connectors: challenge: class: Connector::Builtin::Authentication::Password LOCATION: /home/pkiadm/ca-one/passwd.txt
This will use the cert_subject to validate the given password against a list found in the file /home/pkiadm/ca-one/passwd.txt. For more details, check the man page of OpenXPKI::Server::Workflow::Activity::Tools::ValidateChallengePassword
A request is considered to be a renewal if the request is not self-signed but the signer subject matches the request subject. Renewal requests pass authentication if the signer certificate is valid in the current realm and neither revoked nor expired. You can allow expired certificates by setting renewal.notafter (Not implemented yet!).
If you set the allow_man_authen policy flag, request that fail any of the above authentication methods can be manually authenticated via the UI.
To completly skip authentication, set allow_anon_enroll policy flag.
The policy setting max_active_certs gives the maximum allowed number of valid certificates sharing the same subject. If the certificate count after issuance of the current request will exceed this number, the workflow stops in the PENDING_POLICY_VIOLATION state. There are several settings that influence this check, based on the operation mode:
If you set the auto_revoke_existing_certs policy flag, all certificates with the same subject will be revoked prior to running this check. This does not make much sense with max_active_certs larger than 1 as all certificates will be revoked as soon as a new enrollment is started! The intended use is replacement of broken systems where the current certificate is no longer used anyway.
If the request is a renewal or replacement request, it is allowed to exceed the max_active_certs by one.
The default config has a static value of 1 for renewals and 0 for initial requests. If you set approval_points to 1, this will result in an immediate issue of certificate renewal requests but requires operator approval on initial enrollments.
Assume you want to use an ldap directory to auto approve initial requests based on the mac address of your client:
eligible: initial: value@: connector:your.connector args: - "[% context.cert_subject %]" - "[% context.url_mac %]" connectors: devices: ## This connector just checks if the given mac ## exisits in the ldap class: Connector::Proxy::Net::LDAP::Simple LOCATION: ldap://localhost:389 base: ou=devices,dc=mycompany,dc=com filter: (macaddress=[% ARGS.1 %]) binddn: cn=admin,dc=mycompany,dc=com password: admin attrs: macaddress
To have the mac in the workflow, you need to pass it with the request as an url parameter to the wrapper: http://host/scep/scep?mac=001122334455.
For more options and samples, see the perldoc of OpenXPKI::Server::Workflow::Activity::Tools::EvaluateEligibility
A request is approved if it reaches the number of approvals defined by the approval_points policy setting. As written above, you can use a data source to get one approval point via the eligibility check. If a request has an insufficient number of approvals, the workflow will stop and an operator must give an approval using the WebUI. By raising the approval points value, you can also enforce a four-eyes approval. If you do not want manual approvals, set the policy flag allow_man_approv to zero - all requests that fail the eligibility check will be immediately rejected.
SCEP Server Token¶
This is the cryptographic token used to sign and decrypt the SCEP communication itself. It is not related to the issuing process of the requested certificates!
The crypto configuration of a realm (crypto.yaml) defines a default token to be used for all scep services inside this realm. In case you want different servers to use different certificates, you can add additional token groups and reference them from the config using the token key.
The value must be the name of a token group, which needs to be registered as an anonymous alias:
openxpkiadm alias --realm ca-one --identifier <identifier> --group ca-one-special-scep --gen 1
Note that you need to care yourself about the generation index. The token will then be listed as anonymous group item:
openxpkiadm alias --realm ca-one === anonymous groups === ca-one-special-scep: Alias : ca-one-special-scep-1 Identifier: O9vtjge0wHpYhDpfko2O6xYtCWw NotBefore : 2014-03-25 15:26:18 NotAfter : 2015-03-25 15:26:18
Profile Selection / Certificate Template Name Extension¶
This feature was originally introduced by Microsoft and uses a Microsoft specific OID (22.214.171.124.4.1.311.20.2). If your request contains this OID and the value of this oid is listed in the profile map, the workflow will use the given profile definition to issue the certificate. If no OID is present or the value is not in the map, the default profile from the server configuration is used.
The map is a hash list:
profile_map: tlsv2: I18N_OPENXPKI_PROFILE_TLS_SERVER_v2 client: I18N_OPENXPKI_PROFILE_TLS_CLIENT
Subject rendering is based on the profile and subject information given in the config:
profile: cert_profile: I18N_OPENXPKI_PROFILE_TLS_SERVER cert_subject_style: enroll
The subject will be created using Template Toolkit with the parsed subject hash as input vars. The vars hash will use the name of the attribute as key and pass all values as array in order of appearance (it is always an array, even if the attribute is found only once!). You can also add SAN items but there is no way to filter or remove san items that are passed with the request, yet.
Example: The default TLS Server profile contains an enrollment section:
enroll: subject: dn: CN=[% CN.0 %],DC=Test Deployment,DC=OpenXPKI,DC=org
The issued certificate will have the common name extracted from the incoming request but get the remaining path compontens as defined in the profile.
Revoke on Replace¶
If you have a replace request (signed renewal with signer validity outside the renewal window), you can trigger the automatic revocation of the signer certificate. Setting a reason code is mandatory, supported values can be taken from the openssl man page (mind the CamelCasing), the delayed_revocation_time is optional and can be relative or absolute date as consumed by OpenXPKI::DateTime, any empty value becomes “now”:
revoke_on_replace: reason_code: superseded delayed_revocation_time: +000002
The above gives your friendly admins a 48h window to replace the certificates before they show up on the next CRL.
Note: Without any other measures, this will obviously enable an attacker who has access to a leaked key to obtain a new certificate. We used this to replace certificates after the Heartbleed bug with the scep systems seperated from the public network.
The name of the workflow that is used by this server instance.
The scep standard is a bit unclear if the root should be in the chain or not. We consider it a security risk (trust should be always set by hand) but as most clients seem to expect it, we include the root by default. If you are sure your clients do not need the root and have it deployed, set this flag to 1 to strip the root certificate from the getcacert response.
The workflow context¶
outdated - needs adjustment for new workflow
The workflow uses status flags in the context to take decissions. Flags are boolean if not stated otherwise. This is intended to be a debugging aid.
Weather the keysize of the csr matches the given array. If the key_size definition is missing, the flag is not set.
Result of the approval check done in CalcApproval.
The request is within the configured renewal period.
The number of given manual authentications. Can override missing authentication on initial enrollment.
The internal request id is really unique across the whole system.
The signer and the csr have the same public key. Note: If you allow key renewal this might also be a renewal!
The signer certificate is recognized as an authorized signer on behalf. See authorized_signer_on_behalf in the configuration section.
The signature on the PKCS#7 container is valid.
The request subject matches the signer subject. This can be either a self-signed initial enrollment or a renewal!
The signer certificate is marked revoked in the database.
The PKI can build the complete chain from the signer certificate to a trusted root. It might be revoked or expired!
The notbefore/notafter dates were valid at the time of validation. In case you have a grace_period set, a certificate is also valid if it has expired within the grace period.
The provided challenge password has been approved.
Request was authenticated using kerberos (not implemented yet)
The profile name as extracted from the Certificate Type Extension (Microsoft specific)